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White: Jemand von Niemand

JEMAND VON NIEMAND, DEATH-CAMP DOCTOR:
EVIL AS STRUCTURING PRINCIPLE IN THE LATER
FICTION
WILLIAM STYRON

Terry White

Kent State University (Ashtabula
When Styron’s death-camp doctor confronts Sophie with her
terrible choice in the final pages of the novel, nearly all of the book’s
quarter of a million words have been spent in preparing the reader for
this last bit of narrative unraveling so that we see, through the eyes of
young Stingo, what the source of Sophie’s anguish has been
throughout the summer of his dangerous acquaintance with her and her
lover, Nathan Landau.1 As
agonizes at the instant of her arrival
in Auschwitz, forced to choose one child to save by this inebriated,
tortured intellectual at the selection ramp, she blurts out which of her
two children’s murdering she is forced to participate in: ‘“Take the
baby!’ she called out ‘Take my little girl!”’ (p. 484). And so Emmi is
led off to the crematorium at Birkenau; Jan (her boy, whom she will
never see again) is removed to the children’s camp. Unsurpassed in
Styron’s fiction for the sheer portrayal of a character’s physical and
emotional suffering, Sophie’s Choice exemplifies techniques of
narration that Styron has been using since Lie Down in Darkness
(1951) which, like his signature theme of ineradicable and ancient
human
breathes life into an allegorical framework.
The enigmatic appearance of Dr. Jemand
Niemand in Chapter
13 may seem anticlimactic and externally imposed by the mature
Stingo; he narrates from that temporally distant point from which
amiable, old-fashioned narrators emerge to address
with a kind of
chatty and engaging familiarity of nineteenth-century narrators as
concerned about a character’s motivation as they presumed their readers
to be—a universal condition of the serialized novel. Informal asides to
the reader characterize this narrator’s performance as far back as Chapter
9, when the epiphanal mentality of twenty-two-year-old Stingo set
aside for the enlightened, backward-glancing man who lived to fulfill
the promise he made from the Coney Island beach where he lay
obsessed through the night by Sophie’s erratic life from Warsaw to the
Bronx. He delivers his promise to tell Sophie’s story in the historical
context of Auschwitz and the Holocaust just as the real author had
fulfilled a promise to tell the story of Nat Turner’s rebellion from his
boyhood in the Virginia Tidewater region.
Styron’s preference for psychopaths, human-monsters, and
metamorphosing devils may seem merely another shopworn variation
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on the freaks of Faulkner, O’Connor, and McCullers. They make
excellent moral agents, at least one critic has noted.2 Sophie’s grief
and suffering are compelling—even independently of Auschwitz’s
horrors—but she cannot express more than her own sorrow, in her
as a narrating persona of Stingo’s (he subsumes himself, psychically
and ideologically—and idiomatically into her being). The great
historical tragedy of the death-camps looms large and controversial, as
did the volatile times of racial conflict of the sixties when The
Confessions of Nat Turner (1967) found a hostile reception among
some black readers who resented the appropriation of a black man’s
being.3 The creator of Sophie, although she is not Jewish, effected
similar antagonism as a result of his appropriation of Auschwitz’s
enormous human tragedy for the purposes of fiction, and as he did to
critics of Nat Turner then, he asserts (this time, in the opening pages of
Chapter 9 itself) the primacy of art by rebutting the convictions of Elie
Wiesel and George Steiner that novelists “cheapen” the Holocaust by
using it, and that it the “possession alone of those who suffered and
died, or survived it” (p. 218).
What makes Jemand von Niemand interesting to us is neither the
postponement of his entry into the narrative threading but his
placement: he is tethered to the novel’s events and existents with the
frailest of threads—an exquisite choice of Styron’s own in balancing
multiple narrators—so that the reader is brought into collusion with the
creating persona of the mature Stingo’s last narrative moments in
facing us with a character who: 1) does not exist (in the framework of
the storyworld); 2) is a shared property of the narrating performances of
Sophie (who told Stingo about a “real” death-camp doctor), young
Stingo (who “forgot” details of this part of Sophie’s narration), and the
mature Stingo, the accomplished, discursive voice of Chapter 9, who
greets us with a modest and self-effacing polemic about the Holocaust
authors and presumptive novelists.
To Styron appraisers in the career-author mode, a divided house
surely, this is a glove thrown in the general direction of his harshest
critics. How often he has heard that his novels sprawl out of control,
that he cannot handle point of view, or that he is prolix even for a
transplanted Gothic Southern regionalist no one
say. Nonetheless,
I am convinced that the creation of Jemand von Niemand is a further
reason that we ought to borrow a suggestion from Wayne Booth’s The
Company We Keep (1988) and consider a sensible approach to career
author criticism for authors whose vision maintains a fixed course
despite the deconstructionists limping behind them and snapping at
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their heels.4 (Career-author criticism presumes inherent values and
avows a non serviam to the followers of Paul de Man.) Styron’s
artifice of the doctor’s creation is anachronistic but not maladroit.
Thackeray and Trollope pulled similar strings of their puppets and as
often as not declaimed to readers about the hypothetical motives; in this
sense we may look at Henry James’s penchant for examining mere
slivers of gesture, nuance, and feeling at great length while the action
stops—and, as we all know, James is not above an occasional “dear
reader” aside himself.
Styron is, in effect, looking back technically—beyond the
nineteenth-century parlor tricks, however—to the well-trod path of
allegory itself in his own painstaking consideration of the relationship
between his art, his characters, and their relationship to the greatest
collapse of moral values in our century. It is allegory, ultimately, that
exists at the bottom of a vortex of cycles that makes Jemand von
Niemand’s place and presence clear in the unfolding narrative’s
deployment by several hands and at several removes in time.
Consider, for instance, the small portion of Sophie’s narrating
duties where the narrative voice and point of view coincide; her story is
“recast” by Stingo for us in terms of the idiosyncrasies and phraseology
of Sophie, ostensibly from two vantage points in the storyworld: the
hotel room in Washington where she and he have fled Nathan Landau in
his murderous rage and that other temporal remove in the indefinite
future from
all narratives proceed.
Doctor Jemand von Niemand [Somebody from Nobody] is an
historical composite of types from the infamous Doctors’ Trials after
Nuremberg. The most vicious of all, untried and unindicted until the
1960’s (in absentia by a West German court), had been Josef Mengele,
physician in charge of the female barracks at Auschwitz, who died in
Brazil in 1977. Styron’s doctor shares the real vices of certain camp
doctors, such as Werner Rhöde and Hans König, who would frequently
show up intoxicated for duty at the selection ramp.5 Although only
one doctor of all those serving Himmler’s 4-point genocidal program
known
Die Endlösung paid with his life (one committed suicide
before execution), many, like the prominent Baron von Verschuer,
resumed their professional and academic lives after the war; von
Verschuer, for instance, had guided Mengele’s career from his position
as director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Berlin and was one of
Europe’s leading geneticists and an ardent spokesman of the Third
Reich’s “unworthy life” precept that exerted a profound spell upon
Mengele during his student years in philosophy and medicine at
urt.
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Of course, Sophie’s doctor is also symbolically linked to the lover
Nathan Landau through a madness exacerbated by the atrocities against
the Jewish people. Sophie, as survivor, is tormented by her memories
of Auschwitz and by Nathan, who preys upon her guilt. The mythical
golem of Jewish folklore, a Frankenstein monster,
the narrator’s
symbol binding all these transformations from the human—Nathan
transmogrifies from sane, protective lover of Sophie to her raging
tormentor; Sophie herself from beautiful woman to crone; and Stingo
from aspiring novelist to, briefly, Jew-hating racist. Even so, the most
dramatic transformation occurs when Sophie confronts the morbid camp
doctor reeling in his boots at the selection ramp; his twisted values
seem a gratuitous evil and inverse rationality—yet her choice (no
choice, of course) as fatalistic and hopeless as
choice of medieval
man in an allegory confronting the devil with cloven hoof and horns.
The symbolic destruction of innocence, eight-year-old Eva Maria
Zawistowska holding her flute she is led away “into the legion of the
damned” (p. 484), is the novel’s great symbol of evil’s wake. Sophie
tells Stingo: “She still had her mís—and her flute,” and at that juncture
Sophie’s and Stingo’s escape
the demented Nathan ceases, and we
are introduced to Dr. Niemand (p. 484).
This confrontation exists in Sophie’s memory as the last of the
Dantean circles of hell she has experienced, but its special place in the
narrator’s re-creation is a result of the mature Stingo authoring and
bringing to fruition the novels the young Stingo aspired to write during
his wild summer with Sophie and Nathan. By means of this repetition
of character—Stingo narrating and acting within his story’s Bronx
temporal zone—and by doubling his characters and themes of
opposition, such Sophie at Auschwitz/Sophie in America; the racist
South of the present/the Jew-hating Poland of Nazi occupation, Styron
makes comprehensible these bisecting planes of time and history.
repetition of character and event between times and narrators intensifies,
we get the cyclical sense of “movement” that Styron has contrived; it is
perhaps faintly reminiscent of Yeats’ intersecting cones or “gyres”
falconry term in A Vision for the swooping effect of the falcon
descending in cycles of greater velocity to strike its prey).
For example, Rudolf Höss’ memoirs, freely incorporated
throughout earlier chapters, anticipate the structuring principle Styron
borrows from Holocaust writers like Arendt and Steiner and puts to use
in Chapter 9 for dramatic effect. At that point, the fictive
autobiographical author has introduced himself, like his good Victorian
predecessors, at a point in the narration of events where Sophie thrust
headlong into the death-camp horrors of Auschwitz after a brief
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summary of her interlude in Warsaw. The intermittent narrating
performances of Stingo alternate with Sophie’s by means of the
transforming powers of the ultimate narrator who adopts the
phraseology and psychology of Sophie herself. The chain of narration
is never doubtful, and the full authorial vision of the book bears down
on the reader in that highly mannered surface eloquence that
characterizes all Styron’s novels. Is it not Percy Lubbock’s axiom that
the finer mind of the author must look over his character’s shoulder,
sometimes borrow his eyes for greater effects
would be possible if
we were confined to the limited conceptual powers of a character in a
storyworld? Clearly, Styron wants to graft a theatre-of-the-absurd
atmosphere onto Sophie’s final narration because of its all-consuming
importance to the book’s theme. Those critics who cry prolixity to
Styron are, I believe, oblivious to the superb alternation of characters,
points of view, and narrating voice within chapters that mark the
relentless progress of cycles toward this final descent into the inferno of
Auschwitz.
Sophie’s life-in-death at the camp is, she reveals, almost privileged
compared to hundreds of thousands of Slavs, Jews, and Gypsies who
worked slave labor for several major German companies. There is
historical precept for the mundane absurdity of Auschwitz. Höss, as
Auschwitz Kommandant, fondly records swimming with his children in
the nearby Sola River. Mengele’s wife Irene, visiting shortly before
the camp was closed in 1944 due to the proximity of the Soviet army,
writes about that everpresent “sweet stench” that pervades the grounds
and about picking blackberries (p. 59).
Evil’s banality is the externally imposed theme, one the mature
Stingo discourses upon at the outset of Chap. 9—but it is also a careerlong theme of Styron, one he has developed and featured in multiple
ways and forms, such as the familial evil of Lie Down in Darkness, the
institutionalized evil of the short novel The Long March (1953) and in
its most insidious form before The Confessions of Nat Turner (Marine
Corps, slavery); the societal evil of Set This House on Fire (1960) is,
in sheer narrative eloquence and ambition, his most articulate
expression of pure human evil, but it failed to impress critics awaiting
yet another tribute to the Gothic Regionalist niche he had carved for
himself in his first book. The many instances of characters evolving
into their opposites or into dream-figures is his application of the
vortex principle in his fiction. SC makes a rational sense out of this
most irrational warping of the civilized instincts of humankind. The
institutionalized evil of slavery in Nat Turner’s epoch was a mere half
step from its most malignant form in Sophie’s Auschwitz.

Published by eGrove, 1992


5

Studies in English, New Series, Vol. 10 [1992], Art. 16

Terry White

149

Styron’s structuring principle of the vortex was first noted as a
Southern Gothic phenomenon by J. Douglas Perry, who describes these
interlocking cycles of repetition of character and event as being
common to the works of Faulkner, Capote, and Styron.6 In technique
Styron has varied little since LDD, which book exposes the hollow
core of the genteel Loftises of Port Warwick, Virginia. Critics largely
ignored the technical virtuosity of mental switchovers into and out of
virtually every major and minor character—the Faulknerian echo swept
all before it, especially Peyton Loftis’s suicidally poetic stream-ofconscious soliloquy (pp. 335-86). This overwrought, Joycean display
mixes interior monologue, narrated monologue (a valuable term first
proposed by Dorrit Cohn in 19667), and covert narration. No critic, to
my knowledge, examined the use of, or deemed significant, the
person segments that frame the story’s setting by taking the reader into
Port Warwick on a commuter train from the North—the very train, one
assumes, which takes the reader North at night, the detritus of the
Loftises’ misery swept away in the jubilation from the riverbank’s
baptismal ceremony (pp. 9-11; 399-400).
Such framework acknowledges Faulkner’s influence, of course;
lushness exactly what turns Nathan Landau into the savage critic of
Stingo’s apprenticeship efforts to describe the death of a young beauty
from his boyhood days in Newport, Virginia. There are numerous
transitions that shift point of view between temporal distances as well
as characters’ psyches—for example, Loftis occasionally communes
with the disembodied voice of his father from the hearse; sometimes
point of view’s literal perceptual powers expands or contracts
independently of characters to whom we might attribute it Such rapid,
precise transitions, once admired in the young Styron, became a weapon
against him in the later books.
It may be true that we use fewer pronominal markers in critiquing
since Wayne Booth’s rebuke in The Rhetoric of Fiction to critics
enamored of structuralism, wafting overseas from France by the early
1960’s.8 Critical readers continue to depend on them, even if one’
approach to literature may assume polemical or exclusively theoretical
directions. Take, for instance, Styron’s short novel about a forced
march at a Marine Corps base in the South. He uses a technique to
enable distance, one familiar in his later fiction: a Jamesian reflector
observes and records impressions of conflicts between characters who
embody the evil within that focal character but who are themselves
dynamic
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The Long March, virtually ignored on appearance in the first issue
of discovery, also drew charges of prolixity and mishandling of point of
view from backward-glancing critics after the appearance of Set This
House on Fire, the long-awaited book after LDD? When Styron
incorporates autobiographical and confessional techniques, as he does in
Nat Turner and SC, he resorts to a problematic form of narration that
Wendy Lesser argues we Americans have special difficulty with: the
autobiography itself.
She claims in “Autobiography and the ‘I’ of the Beholder” that
non-Europeans have great difficulty “spitting out that autobiographical
sign of self’:
[T]he possibility of exchanging positions with the reader
comes about by means of, and as a way of demonstrating, a
strong sense of self-possession. You can be I and I can be
you because each of us possesses that ‘acute consciousness’
of our individuality [quoting Leonard Woolf, in Vol 5 of
his autobiography].10
(26)

Many early critics, for example, alluded to the point of view in this
short novel as being “split,” “omniscient third-person,” and “firstperson.” The Long March, however, is a combination of interior
monologue and first-person that is typical of those third-person
narrations that use the best of both to keep a narrative fabric seamless.
Cohn’s term, narrated monologue, has been ignored for two generations
despite its invaluable discussion of techniques
after Joyce from
Lawrence through Styron to the new fictioneers like Pynchon and
Boyle.
Autobiography and mixtures of narration unaccompanied by tag
labels of “thinking,” “believing,” “feeling,” etc., are numerous in LM
but frequently absent from Set This House onward. Marc Ramer’s
incisive discussion of the rebel-hero motif in LM and STHF based on
themes, not structural principles of narration. But one is not
conventionally detachable from the other.11
Templeton’s form of
“institutionalized evil in LM is a confrontation between himself and
the rebel-hero Capt. Mannix, who momentarily becomes the very
monster he loathes in Col. Templeton. Styron had long since learned
from Nietzsche’s Also Sprach Zarathustra: “Wer mit Ungeheur kampf,
mag zusehn, dass er nicht dabei aum Ungeheur wird” [We who fight
monsters must beware of becoming monsters ourselves]. Each of
Styron’s novels presents a variation of a making of an evil somebody
from Nobody.
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There has never been an effort by Styron’s detractors to remove
accusations of “sprawling” and “looseness of narrative form” that fixed
itself to his work from this point onward; instead vituperation
characterizes many critical commentators after STHF.
Again, traditional terminology suffices—and doesn’t. Lt. Culver’s
role in the preceding work is like that of Peter Leverett in STHF. And
the evil is similar: rather than the microcosm of the Marine Corps,
there is the macrocosm of American society itself—fat with post-War
wealth, money-mad, and arrogantly confident of itself. Like Col.
Templeton before him, Mason Flagg is a kind of hierarchical symbol of
evil personified. His monstrosity is not undercut by the kind of
caricature self-evident in Peter’s naming [Leveret = rabbit]. But Mason
Flagg, Hollywood scion and benefactor of both Leverett and the rebel
figure Cass Kinsolving, seen from two distinct planes of time and
space.
By alternating narrators—Peter at the front of the story and Cass
(Flagg’s victim and murderer) in the second half—we have one more
variation on the classical whodunit formula of crime detection:
reconstructing a crime from the present moment of narration into the
past. Styron’s strategy is based on complementary narrating
performances (Cass’s is subsumed by Peter, the ultimate narrator), and
Leverett, being the well-spoken narrator that he is, does what all
narrators do: he tells us some things and holds back much for
suspense. The recombination of narrators is simpler here than in SC
because it is seemingly put together by Peter two years after the events
in Sambuco, Italy.
One critic, an early detractor of Styron, will serve to illustrate the
sort of criticism that depends upon the anomaly of traditional point-ofview terminology. Norman Kelvin assesses Styron’s fiction from LDD
to Nat Turner, and he finds Styron seriously wanting in artistic control;
specifically, he says Styron is grossly unable to control point of view
with consistency. It is all flawed, either “spurious” or “sentimental”
because Styron fails the test of “calculated discontinuity” that would
otherwise mark his fictional technique as “modernist” (p. 209).12
Kelvin’s reductive generalizations are not based on criticisms of the
novels as
are on the kinds of hasty generalizations plucked from
point-of-view terminology that has been passed down from James,
Lubbock, and several Anglo-American critics after Forster’s Aspects of
the Novel (1927). There no truism so commonplace as that which
says that
failure at so strategic a level as point of view must bring
down tone, setting, characterization, and so forth in a heap.
Kelvin demolishes LM in particular:
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Had Styron kept the focus on Mannix’s struggle with the
concept of Templeton, he might have seen that by giving
his story the structure of a game, he had conquered evil:
that he had internalized it within the mind and feelings of
his main character,
216)

Kelvin understands that Styron has made the “meaning and action
of evil” his special theme, and furthermore that separating evil from a
character may cause that evil to appear extrinsic to the story, which
seems to be what he means when he refers to “a motive for action in an
internalized struggle” (p. 216). However, Mannix is not the “main”
character in his sense: Culver is and Culver’s conceptualizing
(internalizing via his phrasing, psychology, and ideology) of Mannix’s
struggle, and his own struggle with Martnix and the Marine Corps, is
the “game” Styron is playing—and playing fair within the limitations
and privileges of the viewpoints adopted for conveying the game.
Narrated monologue, obviously, would serve us well because of the
clutter accumulated by first- and third-person points of
One may
question whether the triangular relationship of Culver, Mannix, and
Templeton is, in fact, restored to a point of equilibrium at the end of
the story, but one should not refer to banalities about point of view to
do it.
Kelvin is one of the few critics of Nat Turner who render a strong
critical judgment of the novel without recourse to sociological
observations on race-hatred in America. Yet he concludes that Styron
falls short: “For once again in Styron’s work, the unmet requirement
of form has interfered with meaning, and it is form that suggests the
needs of both” (p. 204).
Form is only good, Kelvin implies, when themes are internalized
within a main character’s psyche and bad
it results from what he
calls “diversionary effect,” referring to Styron’s divided characters who
must confront evil with their own fragmented personalities; these
novels are all missed opportunities” because evil is not
to be “a
condition of life” [Styron’s Afterword to LM] or “a determinant of
social forms and conduct” but is instead (in LM specifically) “an
imprint on the imagination that can be divorced from its external cause
and made a motive for action in an internalized struggle” (p. 216).
But Styron, it seems to me, has done precisely what Kelvin,
among others, accuses him of failing to do: the internalized struggles
of Milton Loftis (LDD), Culver (LM), Peter Leverett (STHF) all occur
with their opposite figures as a result of internalized and covertly
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mediated narrative transactions that require repetition and movement
from past to present. These focal characters cannot be subsumed under
traditional rubrics, such as “split” point of view, third-person selective
omniscience and so forth. Contrary to axioms about point of view in
our literature anthologies about narrators who are not identifiable
personae within the story (that is, “objective”) and third-person stories
themselves being “outside” the story, we must revise our notions about
disembodied narrative voices when we clearly have characters’ literal and
perceptual points of view borrowed or attributable within contexts of
sheer inertia. Clearly, if ambiguity of point of view at moments occurs
coincidentally with acts of narrating and reflecting from temporally
removed vantage points, we are not in the presence of heavy-handed
authorial intrusions in every case. (Booth expresses dismay in The
Company We Keep at Ursula’s sudden fit of Weltschmerz in Women in
Love; it is too out of character for her, he says, and reminds us that
“point of view” is “an axis of responsibility,” and any blurring that
results from its failure, as Kelvin clearly sees in Styron’s case, makes it
“an ethical,” not a mere “technical invention.”13
In fact, Sophie's Choice exploits every previous form of narration
Styron had
young Stingo experiences the Holocaust vicariously
through his retrospective of Sophie “that long ago summer,” using her
idiom, eyes, memory, and psychology; the “mature” author, who wrote
the books young Stingo dreamed of writing, addresses his readers from
that NOW—a spatio-temporal point cotemporal with the act of
reading—the amiable and courteous nineteenth-century author steps
forth to reflect upon his characters, the meaning of Auschwitz, his own
fabrications.
When, for instance, the narrator brings us to the point of Sophie’s
choice itself, which of her two children to
we have a layering of
narrative voices, plausible explanations of how the narrating character
happened to get us there—all based on the two simplest dicta of what a
narrator is: the knower of the story and the withholder of information.
For the camp doctor who forces the choice as Sophie steps off the train
with her children is Jemand Von Niemand, a symbolic golem of all the
ineradicable evil and race-hatred in the novel. Dr. Niemand is at the
bottom of this foul vortex where history and fiction, truth and artifice
must collide.
the grown man, and author of all Styron’s “real”
fictions, has fulfilled his promise to Sophie to tell her story. But a
generation after Thomas Pynchon erased Slothrop from Gravity's
Rainbow, many critics like Pearl Bell found this multi-layered act of
narrating to be as sprawling, prolix, and incohesive as its predecessors:
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There is too much in the novel about Stingo’s frustrated
efforts to unburden himself of his pent-up virginity.
Except for the lyrical celebration of Prospect Park in high
summer and a funny account of his failure
conquer an
impregnable fortress named Leslie Lapidus, Stingo’s heavy
preoccupations are prolix and faintly embarrassing.14 (p.
58)

On the other hand, Newsweek's reviewer called the book’s
arrangement of parts “a particularly felicitous construction” (p. 89).15
Critical terminology that conveys precision is clearly still missing
because we have no adequate ways of agreeing upon subjective
responses based on
generalizations that refer
to degrees of
reliability, gradations of mental perceptions by characters in their own
story-worlds, and derangements of “personhood”: “child,” “idiot,” “nottoo-bright adult,” “innocent eye,” and their ilk.
Consider only what we lack with respect to the ideas about and
responsibilities of a category of narrating agencies we might call
“special,” or in some definable way, which are incidental to the main
narrating
I would cite here such examples as the Wedding Day
segment of LDD (pp. 260-61) and the apocalyptic segment that we
attribute to Cass Kinsolving immediately after his murder of Mason
Flagg in STHF. All narrators know their stories, but special narrators
frequently take control of the narrative voice without rending the fabric
and destroying our notions of verisimilitude and unity.
As a final example, Sophie’s point of view and hers alone must
account for portions from Cracow, Warsaw, and Auschwitz. Stingo’s
naivete precludes his being narrator until he has acquired the vision of
unimaginable horror from Sophie herself (and gains the experience of
his involvement with the other portion of the triangle Nathan the
brilliant, demented “monster” of
novel).
In Chapter 9, we meet this special narrator in the abrupt but
courteous invocation to play the game with the narrator as long as both
sides agree to the subterfuge:
As will be seen in due course (and the fact is important to
this narrative), Sophie told me a number of lies that
summer. Perhaps I should say she indulged in certain
evasions which at that time were necessary in order for her
to retain her composure. Or maybe her sanity. I certainly
don’t accuse her, for from the point of view of hindsight
her truths seem fathomable beyond need of apology. Th
passage awhile back about her early life in Cracow, for
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example—the soliloquy which I have tried to transcribe as
accurately as I have been able to remember it—is, I am now
certain, made up mostly of the truth, (p. 97)

The idea of the special narrator is a simple option of a narrator’s
choice. “Random selection” a traditional term for this kind of mental
switchover, but it fails to describe this case and the ends effected by this
narrative. None of this is
Seymour Chatman, in his structuralist
toxonomy of featural analyses of point of view in Story and Discourse
(1978) has proposed
own coinage to refer to a covert narrator’s
prerogative of jumping from mind to
“shifting limited mental
access.” But the suasiveness of any rhetorical device should always, he
argues in a recent article, “confirm a text’s validity,” or, simply,
“please.” Throughout “The ‘Rhetoric’ ‘of’ ‘Fiction,’” he claims that
rhetoric cannot be taxonomically biased: “It is not concerned so much
with the definitions of techniques like narrative voice or flashback but
with showing how they apply to the text’s ends—the set of explicit and
implicit mental suasions to the implied reader” (p. 44).16
Similar to Booth’s complaint about Lawrence and his characters,
Chatman says that what matters most is promoting a sense of
“fulfillment” in the reader (p. 43). Not easy task, of course, for
textual enjoyment and fulfillment are not simple
matters....Clearly the ancient rhetor’s solicitation of
approval of the form of his speech quite apart from its
content prefigures the novelist’s solicitation of the reader’s
acceptance of the validity of the way [Chatman’s emphasis]
the novel is put together, regardless of what the novel is
about, (p. 43)

Bad esthetics equals bad choices. Such a bad choice, asserts
Chatman, was made by Lawrence in “Love Among the Haystacks”
because the “well-spoken narrator” is extrinsic to the story-world of
Midlands farmers. This is true, he
of the Lawrence canon:
The verisimilitude of his fictions...founders to the extent
that the implied author shows himself unwilling or unable
to strike a balance between the narrator’s voice and the
voices of the characters, (p. 47)

And so we come full circle to our starting point, and the word
verisimilitude—once an archaism of subjective criticism and literary
biography—is back in style. It is not clear what the two-decade hiatus
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between structuralism and deconstructionism’s waning will mean to
theoretical criticism. We see a daily escalation of voices raised against
the followers of Paul de Man, the Yale professor and “archdeacon of
deconstruction,” as David Lehman calls him in the second part of his
Signs of
Times (New York: Poseidon, 1991). But it is beyond the
scope of my critique of the later fiction of Styron. I must therefore
conclude without solution to the problems of imprecision in our text
anthologies by a final quotation from Booth’s The Rhetoric of Fiction'.
“In dealing with the types of narration, the critic must always limp
behind, referring constantly to the varied practice which alone can
correct his temptations to overgeneralize” (p. 165).
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Malin (Athens, 1975), pp. 208-26.

13(Berkeley, 1988), p. 450.
edition.

All references will be to this
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